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PROFESSOR FULTON'S VIEW OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
by Ramakrishna Puligandla 
It is well known that Husserl's investigations lead to constitutive analyses 
and therewith to transcendental idealism, a position unpalatable to many 
phenomenologists.1 There has been considerable dispute as to how Husserlian 
idealism is to be understood and interpreted. Is it of the Platonic variety, the 
Berkeleyan variety, or the Hegelian variety? Whatever the answer to this 
question, one thing seems clear: Husserlian idealism is inextricably bound up 
with the problem of the circle of infinite reflexion and that of the transcenden- 
tal ego. The circle of infinite reflexion has to be broken in order that the 
phenomenologist may bring his reductions and analyses to bear upon the world 
of natural attitude; otherwise, the phenomenological analyses, interesting and 
illuminating in themselves, do not seem to have any bearing on our everyday, 
as well as scientific, experience. As regards the transcendental ego (pure con- 
sciousness), one is not sure whether such a thing exists. What is more, the very 
concept of the transcendental ego raises the problem of ineffability, which 
seems to strike at the heart of phenomenology as the rational and presupposi- 
tionless science of essences. The two central problems of phenomenology, then, 
are: breaking out of the circle of infinite reflexion and dissolving the mystery 
of the ineffability associated with the transcendental ego. 
As a student, I discussed these problems with Professor Street Fulton, and 
his solution (resolution?) seems to me to be pre-eminently Heideggerian. Hus- 
serl distinguishes between the transcendental ego (pure consciousness) and the 
human ego (world-immersed ego), and grants primary reality to the former as 
the ultimate residuum of transcendental reduction. Further, according to Hus- 
serl, the transcendental ego is the subject which is the source of all objectivity. 
On the other hand, the human ego is the human being in his involvement with 
the world. Husserl himself formulated and dealt extensively with the concept 
of Lebenswelt essential to understanding the human ego in its engagement with 
the world. For Husserl, however, the reduction which takes us from the 
cultural-scientific world to the Lebenswelt is merely a necessary guide for the 
more important phenomenological reductions and analyses. In other words, 
for HusserI the reduction to the Lebenswelt is not an end in itself, but only 
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a necessary means to the all-important transcendental reduction and constitu- 
tive analyses. I have already pointed out that the constitutive analyses lead u p  
to the transcendental ego and therewith to some form or other of idealism. I t  
seems to me  (I say this with considerable caution) that Professor Fulton, very 
much like Heidegger, rejects as untenable Husserl's concept of the transcen- 
dental ego and maintains that human existence is essentially in the world- 
Being-in-the-world is the fundamental structure of Dasein (being-there, a term 
Heidegger uses to designate Person). It needs to be emphasized again that this 
insight concerning human existence is to be found in Husserl himself: 
human exxstence as such 1s always related consc~ously to an ex~stent pract~cal rvorld as a 
surrounding world already endowed wlth humanly ~ ~ g n ~ f i c a n t  predicates. . . .' 
T o  elaborate on this point, Husserl regarded Being as essential Being-the 
universals which by their inherence in particular objects and events, actual 
and possible, make them what they are. Naturally enough, investigation of 
Being in this sense required Husserl to ignore questions of existence and 
non-existence. Hence the phenomenological epoch6 (suspension of judgment 
and bracketing the world of natural attitude). If I understand Professor Fulton 
correctly, he, along with Heidegger, modified and broadened the scope of 
phenomenology to  include questions of existence and non-existence. In other 
words, for Professor Fulton, phenomenology is no longer simply inquiry into 
essential Being but Being itself. Suspension of judgment is rejected and every 
phenomenon is now showing-itself-in-itself, in the most concrete manner. 
Phenomena are no longer cut away from Being but are Being itself. Phenome- 
nology conducted in this manner is none other than what Heidegger calls 
"Fundamental ontology." This is an important point in that it marks the 
departure of Professor Fulton and Heidegger from Husserl: whereas for Hus- 
serl evidence is that which is grasped within the suspension of judgment, for 
Professor Fulton it is that which shows-itself-in-itself without any suspension. 
In a word, Husserlian phenomenology is essential phenomenology, whereas 
that of Professor Fulton and Heidegger is existential, concrete phenome- 
nology. 
The important question to ask now is: d o  phenomena show themselves in 
the same manner to everybody? If not, is not subjectivism an essential element 
of concrete phenomenoIogy? The answer to the first question is clearly in the 
negative and consequently the second is answered affirmatively. There is no 
reason to believe that phenomena show themselves in the same manner to 
everybody; different persons may see one and the same thing differently; what 
is more, one and the same person may see something differently a t  different 
times and in different Lebenswelt situations. The  reports of different concrete 
phenomenologists need not always agree. One should expect them to disagree 
more often than not. The  significance of these observations to concrete phe- 
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nomenology is that the concept of the Person becomes central. This is simply 
another way of saying that there is an intrinsic connection between fundamen- 
tal ontology and the Person. But it is important to note that "Person" here 
means something more basic and generic than its ordinary usage implies. I 
believe that Professor Fulton's explication of the concept is very similar to that 
of Heidegger. 
Heidegger uses the term "Daseirz (being-there)" to designate the P e r ~ o n . ~  
Person as Dasein is what discloses the world. That is, there can be no talk of 
Being in any sense other than that implied by Dasein. Person, then, is not 
something standing over and against Being; rather, it is that through which 
Being is revealed. The world is my world, as disclosed by me as Dasein. As 
such, there can be no question of suspension and bracketing and discovering 
Being as essences in the light of the transcendental ego. Being reveals itself 
through the Dasein in its throbbing concrete reality. It is worth remembering 
that all this is a direct consequence of rejecting Husserl's transcendental reduc- 
tion and therewith the transcendental ego. 
It is easy to see from the above that for Professor Fulton, as it is for 
Heidegger, Existenz is the essence of P e r ~ o n . ~  It should be borne in mind that 
"Existenz" here is not to be understood in its ordinary traditional sense of 
being (existence) as the correlative of non-being (nonexistence). Heidegger uses 
the term 'kxistentia" to convey this traditional sense. What is meant by saying 
that Existenz is the essence of Person? It simply means that Person is essen- 
tially related to what is other than itself. That is, Being, as it manifests itself 
through Person, is essentially related. More importantly, it can manifest itself 
in no other way. 
One might ask now whether the existential phenomenologist's rejection of 
Husserl's transcendental reduction and along with it the transcendentaI ego 
entails the rejection of the entire concept of transcendence. The answer to this 
question is clearly in the negative. For, interestingly enough, the concept of 
transcendence is built into that of the Person. "Existenz" in the Heideggerian 
sense derives from the Latin existere, which means to stand forth, to arise.5 
And since Existenz is the essence of the Person, it follows that the Person is 
always standing out from its being; in a word, human reality is always a being 
toward. This in turn means that human beings are capable of self-transcen- 
dence. In this manner, then, transcendence and in particular self-transcen- 
dence are integral to existential phenomenology. And in my judgment any 
philosophy which recognizes and fosters self-transcendence 1s worthy of its 
calling. 
It follows from the concept of the Person that the Person is "no thing, no 
substance, no objectqW6 Nor is the Person pure consciousness (HusserI's pure 
ego). The Person is that which performs intentional acts. Thus the world is 
not a world of objects and events. It is worId as involvement of Being in the 
Person-an aspect of the Person. Pu t  differently, for the existential phenome- 
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nologist the world is not to be identified with the objective-scientific world nor 
any aspect thereof; rather, it is what gives itself to us immediately as our basic 
situation, namely, being-in-the-world. It is thus the world of possibilities. It is 
not a closed, fixed, unit; quite the contrary, it is the matrix of the possibilities 
of the Person as Existenz. Thus the world of the concrete phenomenologist is 
neither the scientific nor any other kind of objectified world of objects, events, 
properties, and relations. It is through and through the world of meaning and 
significance-the worldliness of the world.' 
It is in this manner, then, I think, that Professor Fulton makes the transition 
from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to concrete existential phenom- 
enology. The problem of the circle of infinite reflexion as well as that of the 
transcendental ego simply vanishes as soon as one makes the Lebenswelt the 
proper concern of phenomenological inquiry. This does not mean, however, 
that the Husserlian kind of phenomenological investigation is abandoned al- 
together. Quite the contrary: it has its place in the investigation of essences of 
phenomena in an objective, scientific sense. Thus the move from transcenden- 
tal phenomenology to existential phenomenology is fundamentally a shift in 
meaning, value, and significance. Man as being-in-the-world is the focus of 
concrete phenomenology. Exploration of the Dasein provides us with insights 
into the extraordinarily complex phenomenon of the human being and opens 
up vast vistas of inquiry into psychology, anthropology, history, religion, and 
myth. In this lies the great power and fecundity of existential phenomenology. 
This view does justice to the best of scientific philosophy (for example the 
Whiteheadian) and to human reality as grasped through the rich and complex 
concepts of Lebenswelt, Dasein, and Existenz as the essence of the Person. 
Although there appears to be disagreement among Heidegger's interpreters 
about his appraisal of the importance of science, he does seem to underestimate 
the value of knowledge derived from the sciences. In Professor Fulton's vision 
there is no room for devaluing science. Science is assigned its proper place and 
its worth and validity are recognized in the appropriate domain of human 
experience. On the other hand, Professor Fulton never allowed science and 
scientific philosophy to cloud and dwarf our fundamental being-in-the-world, 
infinitely richer and immensely more compIex than the scientific picture of 
man with its pet reductionist dogmas paraded as profound truth. 
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